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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
reorganization but for the "boot" received.2" The Howard ruling would
render meaningless the twenty per cent rule of section 368(a) (2) (B),21
since any "C" type transaction could be considered as a reorganization if
the receipt of "boot" were to be completely omtted.22 Taking the How-
ard decision to its extreme, it would authorize the giving of non-voting
stock or securities and voting stock in any "B" type transaction, since the
transaction would meet the statutory requirement when considered but
for the non-voting stock or securities given.23 The above situation clearly
defeats the statutory definition limiting a "B" reorganization to the use
of voting stock. 4
MLAN D. KARLAN
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW - CONVEYANCING - TITLE
COMPANIES AND REAL ESTATE BROKERS
Lohse v. Hoffman, 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961)
When the plaintiffs filed complaints seeking a declaratory judgment
defining the practice of law in which the defendant realtors and corporate
tide companies might not engage, the problem presented was one of first
impression in Arizona.' The court defined the practice of law as the
doing of those acts, whether performed in the court room or in the law
office, which lawyers historically have carried on. The court held that
when the defendants prepared, as between third parties, documents af-
fecting the title to property and when they gave advice as to the legal
effects of such instruments, their conduct fell within the ambit of the
court's definition, and, further, that such conduct constituted the unau-
thorized practice of law
The essential importance of the present case, apart from its conclu-
sion, lies, first, in its placing the problem of conveyancing by laymen and
lawyers of corporate employers in its proper perspective; second, in its
logical and systematic consideration of all the major theories and doc-
trines applied or rejected by other jurisdictions; and third, in its applica-
tion of two arguments or theories not given significant consideration in
previous cases.
The court took the position that conveyancing in the United States
has not always been regarded as falling within the ambit of the practice
20. Johnson, Reorganizattons - Minority Stockholders, Including Dissenters, N.Y.U. 18Ti
INST. ON FED. TAx. 821, 839 (1960).
21. See note 11 supra.
22. Johnson, Reorganizations - Minority Stockholders, Including Dissenters, N.Y.U. 18TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 821, 839 (1960).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibud.
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Unauthorized Practice of Law
of law reserved exclusively to lawyers.2  Tracing the growth of the law
from antiquity, the court pointed out that in England conveyancing came
to be regarded as a function of those learned in the law However, un-
der the influence of Jacksonian anti-professionalism, the states did not
adopt the English view.3 Therefore, the question before the court was
not whether it should permit an exception in favor of the defendants to
an established rule, but whether conveyancmg was itself a practice which
ought to be reserved to the legal profession. This essentially novel ap-
proach placed the issue in its proper perspective and permitted the court
to consider the theories and doctrines in the light of modern requirements.
Nearly every decision involving the alleged unauthorized practice of
law has begun with a consideration of the public service theory. This
theory requires that the court determine whether a particular matter is
so vested with a public interest as to require special safeguards to insure
its proper performance. On application of this theory, the court in the
present case concluded that the lawyer, by virtue of his special training,
because of his responsibility under the confidential lawyer-client relation-
ship, as well as because of the supervision of his conduct by the courts,
was best qualified to provide legal services and give legal advice as to
legal matters.4
The compensation theory, the simple instrument doctrine, the inci-
dental theory, and the long-standing custom theory have all been used
to permit practices which the court in the present case prohibited. The
Arizona court considered and rejected each.5
1. Lohse v. Hoffman, 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d 1 (1961) The plaintiffs were the integrated
state bar and certain attorneys individually and as members of the State Bar Committee on
Unauthorized Practice. The complaints alleged that the defendants were engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law by drafting and formulating certain documents affecting tide to
real property, giving legal advice regarding these documents, and, in the case of the realtors,
charging a separate fee for the service.
2. The court in the present case accepted the position, taken by the great majority of courts,
that the ultimate power to determine the "practice of law" rests with the judiciary. A Min-
nesota court in the leading case of Cowern v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W 795 (1940),
adopted the same position. However, that court accepted by rule of comity a legislative
declaration of public policy exempting real estate brokers from the application of a state statute
prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law when they were engaged in drafting instruments
incidental to real estate transactions.
3. In In re Leach, 134 Ind. 665, 668, 34 N.E. 641, 641-42 (1893), the court pointed out,
"Whatever the objections of the Common Law of England, there is a law higher in this coun-
try, and better suited to the rights and liberties of American citizens, - that law which accords
to every citizen the natural right to gain livelihood by intelligence, honesty and industry in
the arts, sciences, the professions, or other vocations."
4. By contrast, in two recent cases it has been held that although standard form conveyancing
constitutes the practice of law, the public interest requires that it not be restricted to lawyers.
Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957);
State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger, 14 Wis. 2d 193, 109 N.W.2d 685 (1961).
5. The compensation theory holds that although legal services may be properly performed
when incident to a regularly established business, such services become the unauthorized prac-
tice of law when separately compensated. This theory was rejected on the ground that reliance
1962]
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In adopting the substantial interest theory the court merely recog-
nized the principal that one may represent himself in propria persona in
matters where his rights or obligations may be substantially affected. In
dealing with this theory, the Arizona court established a guide for the
future conduct of the defendants. The court held that neither compen-
sation for services nor premiums on title policies would satisfy the require-
ments of substantial interest. However, where the defendants acquired
either a legal or equitable interest in property transferred between third
parties, the requirements would be satisfied. In contrast to the narrow
construction given the substantial interest theory in the present case, at
least one court has held that a title insurance company has sufficient in-
terest in the subject matter to effect the transfer of real property between
third parties in order that it might issue a title policy on that property 6
In laying its proscription upon the defendants, the court relied sub-
stantially upon a renewed consideration of two arguments. The first
emerged from an analysis of the Canons of Professional Ethics and was
applied only in the case of those defendant title companies employing
lawyers. In addition to the well-established proposition that a corporation
cannot practice law, the court argued that the Canons of Professional
Ethics oblige the lawyer-employee to live by a code diametrically opposed
to that by which business men must live in order to survive. The de-
fendant title companies' business was the sale of real property and the
subsequent issuance of title insurance policies. In facilitating the sale, the
lawyer-employee's primary concern was with the interests of the employer
rather than those of the client. Furthermore, the lawyer-employee was
usually required to represent three clients, the title company and the two
customers involved in the transaction. Thus, the lawyer-employee vio-
lated the Canons, for, as the court pointed out, under Canon 6 "a lawyer
by the client on the advice or service rendered determines whether certain conduct constitutes
the practice of law, rather than whether the advice or service is rendered for a fee. Contra,
Washington State Bar Ass n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 Wash. 2d 697, 251 P.2d 619
(1952) (compensation immaterial) Under the simple instrument doctrine, the layman
has been permitted to do certain legal work, e.g., filling in standard forms incident to his
regular business when it did not involve the resolution of complex questions of law. See
Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952) The Arizona court refused to adopt
this doctrine for the reason that even simple legal instruments require legal skill in selecting
the language which will best effect the objectives of the client.
The incidental theory, that legal service given, legal instruments prepared, or other services
normally provided by attorneys do not constitute the practice of law when performed ancillary
to another business, was rejected because it ignored public welfare. Contra, Keyes Co. v.
Dade County Bar Ass n, 46 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1950), reaffirmed, Cooperman v. West Coast
Title Co., 76 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954) The long-standing custom theory permits the practice
of law by those who would be prohibited from such practice but for the fact that it has "long
tacitly [been] permitted and worked reasonably well." State ex rel. Reynolds v. Dinger,
14 Wis. 2d 193, 199, 109 N.W.2d 685, 692 (1961) The court in the present case held
that one does not acquire a prescriptive right to practice law by the mere passage of time and
that the public interest required that such conduct be prohibited.
6. Cooperman v. West Coast Title Co., 75 So. 2d 818 (Fla. 1954); accord, Ingham County
Bar Ass n v. Walter Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955)
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